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Korean unification might offer China a conducive environment in the broader Northeast Asian/East Asian region which might encourage Taiwan to start preparing for a merger with mainland China at some point. Such scenarios are only strengthening China’s prospects in the region, making Beijing slowly emerge as the most significant player in the denuclearisation process in times to come, both within and outside the UN mandate. If the peace process after the Panmunjom summit continues, China might even like to extend further the validity of the treaty or might slightly modify its context given the unfolding context between the Koreas. Sino-South Korean relations must have gone through a low phase after the deployment of THAAD, but neither China nor South Korea has abandoned each other as partners in the region. The Panmunjom declaration mentions China’s role only in passing in a quadrilateral format.
 It immersion blender  goes without mentioning that China’s role as a resident power in the region will be significant in shaping the future of the Korean Peninsula. Does this imply that China’s role and influence in the Korean Peninsula region has eroded in contrast to Trump’s new outreach to the Koreas?Beijing has reason to worry since the credit for the third inter-Korean summit goes more either to Moon Jae-in’s “responsible” foreign policy or to Trump’s smart outreach policy with the Koreas even though some might argue that Pyongyang’s consent to have an inter-Korean meet with Seoul is a result of American “maximum pressure” strategy. Stating that North Korea and South Korea “belong to the same nation”, China added that it would like to play a “positive role” in the future dialogue, denuclearisation effort and the political settlement of the peninsula issue. Articles II and VI of the treaty still guarantee China’s role as a protector of North Korea, it also assures the role as a key “strategic ally” and, most importantly, as a peace-maker in the peninsula. The forthcoming Trump-Kim meeting further indicates that US diplomacy is working. Expectations in the Korean corridors are high on the prospects and outcome of the forthcoming meeting between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-Un.

For Seoul, restoring peace is the utmost priority at the present scenario than “complete denuclearisation”. Even though the prospect of Korean unification is a distant dream and the meaning of unification is still an abstract concept, China’s eventual aim would be to maintain a balance between the two Koreas and try to maximise its influence in the unification process. If the two “informal meetings” that were held between Kim Jong-un and Xi Jinping recently in Beijing and Dalian respectively have any clue to offer, China still maintains the edge as a resident power in the peninsula. South Korea might be an American ally, but South Korea’s trading economy is closely linked and somewhat regionally dependent on the trade and economic contacts with China. American troops’ presence in Northeast Asia over the years, South Korea’s recent stated position to allow American stationed troops to stay back, and the refusal to remove THAAD from South Korea are additional reasons for China to worry.
Politics in the Korean Peninsula is witnessing rapid changes, with both North Korea and South Korea coming together after decades of mutual isolation and division. Further, China would protect North Korea from the US and from the UN inspection for an immediate and complete verification of Pyongyang’s nuclear establishments, including helping to remove the UNSC sanctions. Rather, as a constant historical power in the peninsula, China is remodelling its policies and postures subtly in the Korean corridors, with new content and conditions to its customary Korean Peninsula policy.                                             
Politics in the Korean Peninsula is witnessing rapid changes, with both N and S Korea coming together after decades of mutual isolation. China has many cards to play as a resident power, including its flagship P-5 (permanent membership) card of the UNSC to influence the peace process in the peninsula, including the most sensitive issue of denuclearisation. China continues to be North Korea’s largest trading partner and would be the key economic partner for the return of normal economic conditions in North Korea with the possible removal of sanctions in the post-Panmunjom summit. Since the Korean War’s inception on June 25, 1950, China’s role has been the most important single factor not only in dividing the Koreas but also in leading the non-Western bloc in global affairs. Pledging a ‘no more war’ scenario, the historic Panmunjom declaration, released at the third inter-Korean summit on April 27, promises a “new era” of national reconciliation, peace and prosperity. China’s strategic understanding with North Korea may have weakened in recent years due to the international pressure over Pyongyang’s repeated missile and nuclear tests, but the Sino-North Korean political contacts and understanding are strong enough to shape the politics of the region in times to come. The American pressure tactic of “complete, verifiable, and irreversible” dismantling of North Korea’s nuclear arsenals and facilities would be in juxtaposition with the Chinese standpoint that supports a gradual nuclear-free Korean Peninsula without really demanding a complete dismantling of North Korea’s nuclear weapons.Sino-South Korean relations may also witness steady progress where Beijing would aim to have a better consultative partaking in the prospects of inter-Korean peace process without losing North Korea’s confidence. Dr Jagannath Panda is a Research Fellow and Centre Coordinator for East Asia at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi. This shared perspective of China on denuclearisation with North Korea makes it the most important actor in the Korean Peninsula, which South Korea will find hard to object to. North Korea would not really move ahead to forge any substantial understanding either with South Korea or with the US, virtually breaking away from this accord.